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The country is suffering through the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Tens of 
millions  of  people  face unemployment,  underemployment  and/or  the  loss  of  their  homes.  The 
enormous suffering created by this crisis should be the main focus of economic policy. However, a 
well-funded public relations campaign has managed to largely push the economic crisis to the back 
burner and instead focus on the federal budget deficit. This anti-deficit campaign has helped to 
derail efforts to address the downturn, leading to an enormous amount of unnecessary suffering. 
 
This  paper  corrects  some  of  the  misperceptions  being  fostered  by  the  anti-deficit  campaign.  It 
points out that: 
 
1)  The extraordinary level of current deficits is overwhelmingly the result of the economic 
crisis. There is little reality to the claim that Congress is out of control in its tax and spending 
policies. 
 
2)  The budget deficit does not pose an economic problem at present. If the budget deficit were 
smaller, we would simply be seeing higher unemployment. There would be no short-term or 
long-term benefit from reducing the current deficit. 
 
3)  The size of the longer-term deficit problem has been both exaggerated and misrepresented. 
Projections show that debt-to-GDP ratios will be well within manageable levels at least a 
decade into the future, even if there are no major changes from baseline scenarios. As a 
long-term issue, the United States must fix its broken health care system.  
 
4)  The wealth of near-retirees has been devastated by the collapse of the housing bubble and 
the plunge in the stock market. Any substantial reduction in Social Security or Medicare 
benefits will likely leave large segments of middle-income workers with near-poverty level 
incomes in retirement.  
 
5)  Concerns about foreign ownership of the government debt are offensive jingoism. There is 
an issue about foreign indebtedness because this implies that an increased portion of future 
output will be paid out as interest and/or dividends to foreigners rather than being available 
for  domestic  consumption.  However,  this  is  driven  by  the  trade  deficit, not  the  budget 











The country is suffering through the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Tens of 
millions of people face unemployment, underemployment and/or the loss of their homes. By any 
objective  standard,  the  enormous  suffering  created  by  this  crisis  should  be  the  main  focus  of 
economic policy. However, a well-funded public relations campaign has managed to largely push the 
economic  crisis  to  the  back  burner.  Instead,  news  reports  and  political  debates  are  filled  with 
discussions of the federal budget deficit. This anti-deficit campaign has helped to derail efforts to 
address the downturn, leading to an enormous amount of unnecessary suffering. 
 
This  paper  corrects  some  of  the  misperceptions  being  fostered  by  the  anti-deficit  campaign.  It 
points out that: 
 
1)  The extraordinary level of current deficits is overwhelmingly the result of the economic 
crisis. If any part of the system is “broken,” as claimed by some deficit hawks, it is the 
structure of economic policymaking that allowed for an $8 trillion housing bubble to grow 
unchecked. It was inevitable that this bubble would eventually burst, leading to the sort of 
economic crisis that the country is now experiencing. This crisis was both foreseeable and 
preventable. There is little reality to the claim that Congress is out of control in its tax and 
spending policies. 
 
2)  The budget deficit does not pose an economic problem at present. If the budget deficit were 
smaller, we would simply be seeing higher unemployment. There would be no short-term or 
long-term benefit from reducing the current deficit. 
 
3)  The size of the longer-term deficit problem has been both exaggerated and misrepresented. 
Projections show that debt-to-GDP ratios will be well within manageable levels at least a 
decade into the future, even if there are no major changes from baseline scenarios. As a 
long-term issue, the United States must fix its health care system. This, not demographics, is 
the real long-term deficit problem, as can be easily shown. 
 
4)  The wealth of near-retirees has been devastated by the collapse of the housing bubble and 
the plunge in the stock market. The economic prospects for these age cohorts look bleak 
even  assuming  currently  scheduled  benefits  from  Social  Security  and  Medicare.  Any 
substantial  reduction  in  these  benefits  will  likely  leave  large  segments  of  middle-income 
workers with near-poverty level incomes in retirement.  
 
5)  Concerns about foreign ownership of the government debt are offensive jingoism. There is 
an issue about foreign indebtedness because this implies that an increased portion of future 
output will be paid out as interest and/or dividends to foreigners rather than being available 
for  domestic  consumption.  However,  this  is  driven  by  the  trade  deficit, not  the  budget 
deficit. The trade deficit, in turn, is attributable to the over-valuation of the dollar. The 
deficit  hawks  have  rarely  focused  on  the  value  of  the  dollar,  preferring  instead  to  hype 
misleading concerns about foreign (especially Chinese) ownership of government debt.  
 
There are real issues with the budget that the country will have to address, however virtually all of 
the current discussion of the deficit has been misleading and has obstructed the effort to address the  
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worst downturn since the Great Depression. Remarkably, the country is allowing many of the same 
policy experts whose incompetence led us into this crisis to continue to guide economic policy as we 
try to cope with the crisis. 
 
 
The Surging Deficit: Where Did It Come From? 
 
In fiscal year 2007, the country had a unified budget deficit of $162.8 billion, or 1.2 percent of GDP. 
Since  this  was  at  a  business  cycle  peak,  the  deficit  was  arguably  higher  than  would  have  been 
desirable, but no one would have claimed a deficit of this magnitude posed any major threat to the 
economy. Moreover, there was little need for any major concerns about the size of the deficit for the 
near-term future. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected the deficits to remain low 
through 2011 and then turn to a small surplus in 2012. The budget was projected to remain in 




























CBO Projections 2008 (tax cuts continue)
CBO Projections 2008 (tax cuts expire)
CBO Projections 2010 (2008-09 actual)
 
Sources: The baseline projections are taken from CBO (2008a), Table 1-3. The projections with continuing tax cuts 
are  adjusted  using  the  projected  cost  of  the  tax  cuts,  including  interest,  from  Table  1-5.  The  post-recession 
projections are taken from CBO (2010), Summary Table 1. 
 
 
Arguably, this baseline picture is overly optimistic about the deficit since it assumes that President 
Bush’s tax cuts would be allowed to expire at the end of 2010. It also assumes that a number of tax 
cuts  that  are  regularly  extended,  most  importantly  the  inflation  adjustment  for  the  alternative 
minimum tax, will instead be allowed to expire. Adjusting for these issues makes the budget situation 
look somewhat worse, but hardly out of control.  
 
The deficit in this adjusted set of projections (also shown in Figure 1) averages less than 2.5 percent 
of  GDP  in  the  decade  from  2009  to  2018.  This  is  probably  somewhat  higher  than  would  be  
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desirable, but it is still consistent with a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. Also, it is worth noting that the 
tax cut assumptions in this scenario are somewhat extreme in that they assume that none of the tax 
breaks  for  even  the  wealthiest  families  are  allowed  to  expire  and  the  estate  tax  is  eliminated 
completely.   
 
Of course the budget situation has turned out much worse than was projected at the beginning of 
2008, even under the assumption that the Bush tax cuts and other tax provisions would not be 
allowed to expire. The deficit jumped to 9.9 percent of GDP in 2009 and is projected to be 9.2 
percent of GDP in 2010, as shown in Figure 1. It is not projected to fall back to more normal levels 
until 2014, when it is projected to be 2.7 percent of GDP.  
 
In 2018, the last year of overlap between the two sets of projections, the 2010 CBO baseline shows 
a deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP compared to a surplus of 1.0 percent of GDP in the 2008 baseline. 
While this is a marked deterioration in the budget picture, the overwhelming majority of this change 
is attributable to the worsening of the economic situation rather than legislated changes in taxes or 
spending. Higher interest payments alone, due to the large budget deficits directly caused by the 
recession, account for almost half of the increase in the deficit projections over this period.  
 
The weaker economy projected for 2018 also contributed to the rise in the projected deficit, most 
importantly by reducing revenue and increasing payments for various transfer programs like food 
stamps. CBO has downgraded its projection for  growth over the decade and now projects the 
unemployment rate to be 5.0 percent in 2018, compared to 4.8 percent in its 2008 projection.  
 
The contribution of legislated changes in spending and taxes to the larger deficit is relatively small. 
Only 21.8 percent of the increase in the projected deficit for 2018 over this period was attributable 
to legislated changes in spending. And almost 60 percent of this increase was in defense-related 
spending, as shown in Figure 2. Legislated changes in non-defense spending increased the deficit 
projected for 2018 by less than 0.3 percent of GDP. Legislated changes in revenue actually went the 





                                                 
1    These calculations were obtained from summing the Congressional Budget Office’s calculations of the changes in its 
budget projections due to legislation, from CBO 2008(b) (Table A2), CBO 2008(c) (Table A-1), CBO 2009(a) (Table 
8), CBO 2009(b) (Table 1-3), CBO 2009(c) (Table A1), and CBO 2010 (Table 1-3).    
 
 




Change in the Deficit Projected for 2018 (January 2008 - January 2010) 












Source: CBO, see footnote 1. 
  
 
In short, the longer-term budget picture did not deteriorate primarily due to a spending splurge or a 
spree  of  tax  cutting,  but  rather  due  to  a  much  higher  projected  interest  burden  and  a  weaker 
economy. This higher interest burden is in turn a direct result of the high deficits incurred during the 
downturn, which have substantially increased the national debt.  
 
The jump in the deficit in 2009 and 2010 is also not a result of wasteful spending or reckless tax 
cuts. There were three factors that led to the extraordinary increase in the deficits in these years. 
First and most importantly, the deficits rose for normal cyclical reasons. The budget deficit always 
increases  when  the  economy  weakens.  Tax  collections  fall  when  income  falls.  Similarly,  benefit 
payments for programs like unemployment insurance and food stamps rise when more workers lose 
their jobs. The second reason that the deficits rose was due to the bailouts of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, AIG, and other bankrupt companies. CBO calculated that these bailouts added $243 billion 
(1.6 percent of GDP) to the deficit in 2009. Finally, the stimulus package approved by Congress last 




While the trillion-dollar-plus deficits for 2009 and 2010 have often been held up as examples of out 
of control government spending, the main result of a smaller deficit in these years would simply be 
weaker growth and higher unemployment. The reason for the downturn is the plunge in private 
sector  spending  associated  with  the  collapse  of  the  bubbles  in  residential  and  non-residential 
construction. This fall in spending has left the economy far below full employment levels of output.  
 
The conventional argument against budget deficits is that they pull resources away from the private 
sector. The government’s borrowing raises interest rates, thereby reducing private sector investment 
and consumption. However, there is currently no basis for concern about the government pulling 
away resources from the private sector since there is an enormous amount of unemployed labor and 
capital. In addition, interest rates are presently at historically low levels, being kept there by Fed 
                                                 
2    CBO (2010), Table A-1.  
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policy. This means there is no remotely plausible case that government deficits are crowding out 
private investment. 
 
Rather, the stimulus provided by government spending has boosted the economy. CBO projected 
that in 2009 the stimulus added between 1.4 percent and 3.8 percent to GDP and in 2010 that it will 
add between 1.1 percent and 3.4 percent to GDP. CBO also projected that the stimulus would lower 
the unemployment rate in 2009 by between 0.5 percentage points and 1.2 percentage points, as 
shown in Figure 3. It projected that it would lower the unemployment rate in 2010 by between 0.6 






























Addition to GDP Reduction in Unemployment
 
Source: Averages of ranges in CBO (2009d), Table 3. 
 
 
Given the boost to the economy and employment from the deficits, it would be irresponsible not to 
run large deficits in the current economic environment. In fact, given the extent of the suffering 
associated with levels of unemployment that are now projected to remain well above normal levels 
until 2015, it is arguably irresponsible not to run larger current deficits. The main reason that people 
cannot find work at present is not that they lack the necessary skills or are unwilling to work, but 
rather that economic mismanagement has led to a situation in which the economy is operating well 
below full employment levels of output.  
 
By not providing sufficient economic stimulus to bring the economy more quickly back to full 
employment, policymakers are making a decision to perpetuate this suffering. Inadequate stimulus 
will leave willing workers unable to find jobs and to properly support their children. This is a high  
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price to impose on ordinary workers simply because the economy was poorly managed by people in 
positions of responsibility over the prior decade. 
 
 
The Longer-Term Deficit Picture 
 
The main argument made against additional stimulus at this point is that it would jeopardize the 
standing of the U.S. government in financial markets. This assertion seems to contradict the current 
behavior of financial markets, where long-term Treasury debt continues to be held at very low yields. 
If financial markets questioned the ability of the U.S. government to honor its debt, they should 
already be demanding a premium on longer-term issues, like 10-year or 30-year Treasury bonds. As 
it stands, these bonds continue to trade at interest rates that are near post-World War II lows. In 
other words, the investors who are actually betting on the financial health of the U.S. government 
don’t seem to share the fears of the policy analysts and economists complaining about the deficit.  
 
It is also worth noting that neither the current debt-to-GDP ratio or the ratio projected for 2020 
stand  out  for  being  especially  high  compared  to  either  past  U.S.  levels  or  the  levels  of  other 
advanced countries at present. CBO projects that the year-end debt-to-GDP ratio for 2010 will be 
60.3 percent. It projects that this ratio will rise to 66.7 percent by the end of 2020.
3 Even assuming 
that normal adjustments are made to the baseline for the extension of expiring tax provisions and 
other predictable additions to the deficit, the debt-to-GDP ratio is still likely to be under 90 percent 
by the end of the decade.  
 
By comparison, the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 1946 was 108.6 percent of GDP.
4 So, by 
historic standards, even at the end of the next decade, the United States will still have some distance 
to go before it reaches  prior peak levels of indebtedness. There are also many other advanced 
countries at present that have considerably higher debt levels, as shown in Figure 4. According to 
the data from the International Monetary Fund, France and Germany will have ratios of net debt-to-
GDP of 67.0 percent and 70.3 percent, respectively, at the end of this year. Japan will have a ratio of 
net debt-to-GDP of 104.6 percent and Italy will have a ratio of 112.8 percent.
5     
 
 
                                                 
3    CBO (2010), Summary Table 1. 
4    Economic Report of the President, 2009, Table b-79, available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/ERP/issue/4050/.  
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Source: CBO, ERP, and IMF. See footnotes 4-6. 
 
 
While high debt-to-GDP ratios can impose a burden on government finances and the economy, the 
point of these comparisons is that there is no reason to believe that the United States faces any 
imminent danger of a flight from its debt. It has carried a considerably larger debt burden in the past 
and had no difficulty finding willing lenders at the time. Other countries that currently carry much 
higher debt burdens are still able to borrow at relatively low cost in financial markets. In short, there 
is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  United  States  faces  any  near-term  or  even  mid-term  loss  of 
confidence based on its debt levels. 
 
As a practical matter, it is also not even clear what a crisis in confidence could look like. If domestic 
and foreign investors lost confidence in the government’s ability to service its debt, then presumably 
this would lead to a flight from the dollar. This is turn would put downward pressure on the dollar 
relative to other currencies. Of course, it has been official policy of both the Bush and Obama 
administrations that the dollar should fall against the Chinese yuan. So perhaps the flight from the 
dollar  would  bring  about  this  longstanding  policy  goal  and  thereby  make  U.S.  goods  more 
competitive in world markets.  
 
If investors were to flee the dollar because of the indebtedness of U.S. government, which country 
could they turn to as a safe haven, since most other wealthy countries have comparable or higher 
levels of indebtedness? Furthermore, if there were a large-scale flight from the dollar, would our 
trading partners tolerate a very low and therefore hypercompetitive value of the dollar? How large 
would Europe’s trade deficit with the United States be if the euro bought 2.5 dollars? Would Canada  
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let the U.S. dollar fall to the point where it was only worth 50 Canadian cents? Would the U.K. let 
the dollar fall to the point where the exchange rate was 3 dollars for a pound? 
 
A moment’s reflection should indicate the absurdity of the scenario of a flight from the dollar. Our 
trading partners would have no choice except to intervene to keep the dollar from falling too low; 
otherwise they would see large sectors of their economies destroyed by competition from much 
lower-cost U.S. exports. This is not an argument for pursuing reckless fiscal policies. However, the 
scenario of a full-fledged collapse of the dollar, in a world where the U.S. economy is otherwise 
healthy, is absurd on its face. 
 
There is one final point in this picture that deserves attention. Many analysts have highlighted the 
longer-term  fiscal  deficit  picture,  which  is  indeed  bleak.
6  However,  these  disastrous  deficit 
projections are driven almost entirely by the assumption that per person costs of the U.S. health care 
system continue to get ever further out of line with costs in other wealthy countries. Figure 5 shows 
the  Congressional  Budget  Office’s  long-term  deficit  projections.  It  also  shows  projections  that 
assume that per person health care costs (adjusted for aging) follow the path of per person costs in 
the United Kingdom, Germany, or Canada. In each of these three scenarios, the country would be 




Projected Budget Deficit as Percent of GDP under Alternate Scenarios 
 
Source: CBO (2009e) and World Bank, World Development Indicators.   
 
 
This  graph  should  make  clear  that  the  United  States  really  does  not  have  a  long-term  deficit 
problem. Rather, it has a long-term health care problem, which is a problem of the private health 
                                                 
6    Government Accountability Office, 2009. “The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Fall 2009 
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care system. It becomes a deficit problem because more than half of all health care is paid for 
through public sector programs like Medicare and Medicaid.  
 
This  suggests  the  urgency  of  fixing  the  U.S.  health  care  system.  The  reforms  put  forward  by 
President Obama last year were obviously a step in this direction, although it is not clear what 
reforms will actually be approved (if any) and the extent to which they will control costs. In the 
event that reform of the domestic health care system proves politically impossible, the alternative 
would be to rely increasingly on more efficient foreign health care systems. It is not difficult to 
design mechanisms that would facilitate international trade in medical services.
7 It is surprising that 
either fixes to the health care system or the promotion of greater reliance on foreign health care 
systems have not received greater attention from those raising concerns about budget deficits. 
 
 
Reducing the Budget Deficit: Who Gets Hit? 
 
Almost  invariably,  efforts  to  trim  the  budget  deficit  focus  on  Social  Security,  Medicare,  and 
Medicaid, programs that primarily serve the elderly population.
8 Remarkably, these discussions rarely 
seem to examine the well-being of the groups that will be most affected by proposed cuts. While 
most proposals for deficit reduction would leave current retirees unharmed, they often do propose 
substantial cuts in benefits for near-retirees, workers who are currently in their fifties or late forties. 
 
It is important to recognize that this was precisely the age-cohort that was hit hardest by the collapse 
of the housing bubble. For most middle-income families, their primary source of wealth is their 
home. These workers were old enough to have accumulated some equity in their home, but in most 
cases were still highly leveraged, since they were far from having paid off their mortgage. This meant 
that the plunge in house prices that resulted from the collapse of the bubble largely wiped out their 
equity.  
 
This point can be seen with a simple example. If a worker has fully paid off a mortgage on a 
$300,000 home and it falls in price by one-third, she has lost one-third of the equity in her home. 
However, if she only has $100,000 in equity in a home that is worth $300,000 and the price falls by 
one-third, then she has lost 100 percent of her equity.  
 
This describes the situation faced by many workers who are now within 10-15 years of retirement. 
Many of them had accrued substantial equity in their homes, but saw most or all of it wiped out with 
the collapse of the housing bubble. Figure 6 shows the net worth for the middle quintile of the 
cohorts ages 45-54 and ages 55-64 in 2007 and in 2009. As can be seen, much of their wealth was 
eliminated with the collapse of the housing bubble. The average net worth for the middle quintile of 
households age 55-64 is approximately $180,000, a bit more than the $170,000 price of the median 
                                                 
7    See Baker (2004), Matoo and Rathindran (2006), and Baker and Rho (2009). 
8    It is worth noting that the Congressional Budget Office projects that Social Security benefits will be fully funded by 
its designated tax through the year 2044. This makes the quest to cut Social Security rather peculiar since it implies a 
desire to finance defense and other parts of the budget through a tax that is designated as a “Social Security” tax. 
This sort of measure may seriously undermine public confidence in government and perhaps its willingness to 
voluntarily comply with the tax code.   
 
 




9 In other words, a typical household in this age group could use all of their wealth to pay 
down  the  mortgage  on  their  home  and  then  would  have  essentially  nothing  other  than  Social 



































Source: Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finance and Rosnick and Baker (2010). 
 
 
The average wealth for the middle quintile of the 45-54 age group is just $81,000, a bit less than half 
of the cost of the median house. This group still has some time left in the labor force before 
retirement, so they may be able to accumulate enough to be able to pay off the mortgage on the 
median house, but it is difficult to see how they can save sufficiently in their remaining years in the 
workforce to be able to provide a substantial supplement to their Social Security. In other words, as 
a  result  of  the  collapse  of  the  housing  bubble,  this  group  also  is  likely  to  be  almost  entirely 
dependent on Social Security for their retirement income. 
 
In  this  context,  plans  to  cut  Social  Security  and/or  Medicare  benefits  for  near-retirees  seem 
especially perverse. The housing bubble was allowed to grow unchecked as a result of incredible 
economic mismanagement. Now, many of the people who share the blame for this mismanagement 





                                                 
9   These projections are taken from an analysis of the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finance. See 
Rosnick and Baker (2010).   
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The Foreign Debt Scare Stories 
 
Many of the papers that discuss the problem of the deficit and debt highlight the fact that a large 
and growing portion of the debt is held by foreigners, especially the government of China. Focus 
groups may show that raising the fear of foreign or Chinese ownership of debt is effective politics, 
but this scare tactic completely misrepresents the relevant policy issues.   
 
On its face, there is no obvious reason that we should care who owns the government debt. The 
dumping of government bonds by a hostile government would cause the interest rate on these 
bonds to rise. That would mean that holders of other debt that had previously offered somewhat 
higher  interest  rates  than  government  bonds,  such  as  mortgage-backed  securities  guaranteed  by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, would decide to switch to government bonds to take advantage of the 
higher interest rate. Similarly, investors might switch from holding debt of safe and long-established 
corporations, like Verizon and General Electric, to holding government debt, if the interest rate on 
government bonds had risen. They may also switch from holding the debt of other countries, if 
interest rates on U.S. government debt suddenly became higher than the interest rates on countries 
viewed as less safe. 
 
Because  these  markets  are  so  huge,  it  is  likely  that  the  substitutions  from  other  assets  to  U.S. 
government bonds would eliminate most of the interest rate hike that immediately resulted from an 
initial sell-off by China or any other investor that might be politically motivated. While a sell-off 
could lead to a short-term increase in U.S. interest rates, it is unlikely that any substantial increase 
would be sustained through time, unless there were fundamental problems in the U.S. economy. In 
that case, interest rates would likely rise, regardless of who owned the debt.  
 
There is an issue about foreign ownership of U.S. financial assets more generally, since this means 
that the income from these assets will be paid out to foreigners, thereby reducing the resources 
available for domestic consumption and investment. However, the extent to which foreign investors 
purchase U.S. assets depends on the trade deficit, not the budget deficit. The trade deficit in turn 
depends on the value of the dollar, an issue that is almost never discussed by those complaining 
about foreign ownership of the debt. 
 
The logic here is very simple. A high dollar makes imports to the United States relatively cheap; 
therefore people in the United States will buy more imported goods and services. Similarly, a high 
dollar makes our exports more expensive to people living in other countries, so they will buy fewer 
U.S. exports. The over-valued dollar leads to a trade deficit, which gives China and other foreign 
countries the means to buy up large amounts of U.S. financial assets.  
 
There is no particular reason to care whether foreigners opt to buy U.S. government debt or private 
assets like stocks and bonds. In either case, there will be an outflow of future income generated in 
the U.S. economy to foreign investors, leaving less to be consumed domestically.  
 
Furthermore, if we are concerned for political reasons that foreigners hold large amounts of U.S. 
government bonds, then we should also be concerned if they hold large amounts of private sector 
stock and bonds. Any time they choose, they can sell off their holdings of stock and bonds, and use 
the money to buy U.S. government debt. (Foreign investors are smart enough to know this.) So, the 
point made by the deficit hawks about the share of the government debt held by foreigners is utterly  
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meaningless from a policy standpoint, even if it may be a useful point to advance their political 
agenda. 
 
The budget deficit is irrelevant to the trade deficit, apart from its potential impact in raising the value 
of the dollar. At any given level of output and value of the dollar, our trade deficit would be the 
same regardless of whether the government is running a huge surplus or a huge deficit. Of course, a 
budget deficit can stimulate GDP, as it is doing now, which does lead to higher imports, but few 
deficit hawks argue that we should lower output in order to reduce our trade deficit. 
 
In short, the issue about the foreign ownership of the government debt is entirely a political ploy. It 
has nothing to do with the fundamental economic or policy issues around either the budget or trade 
deficit. The debate over the budget deficit should be focused on serious issues and not crude scare 





The  recent  debate  over  the  budget  deficit  has  been  driven  largely  by  unfounded  fears  and 
misrepresentations of basic economic relationships. The most often asserted claims of the leading 
deficit hawks are simply untrue. The surge in the deficit in the last two fiscal years was not the result 
of an irresponsible Congress or a broken political system. It was a direct result of the crash of the 
housing bubble. The failure by policymakers was to not rein in this bubble before it grew to a size 
where its inevitable collapse would devastate the economy.  
 
Insofar as there is any notable increase in the deficit over the next decade due to policy changes 
rather than economic circumstances, it is primarily the result of higher defense spending associated 
with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Arguably, Congress can be blamed for being unwilling to pay 
for the wars that it supports, but it is worth noting that Congress is not suffering from a general 
pattern of reckless spending or tax cuts.  
 
It is also important to note that the projections of a longer term deficit crisis are driven entirely by 
exploding  private  sector  health  care  costs.  If  the  country  can  repair  its  health  care  system,  or 
promote trade to allow people to take advantage of more efficient health care systems in other 
countries, then future deficits will be quite manageable. 
 
Finally, the discussion of foreign ownership of government debt fundamentally misrepresents its 
cause and importance in a way that seems intended to exploit xenophobic fears. There is a legitimate 
concern about the drain of future income that results from foreign ownership of U.S. financial 
assets, but this is a completely separate issue from the percentage of the government debt held by 
foreigners. Furthermore, foreign ownership of U.S. assets depends on the trade deficit. It has no 
direct relationship to the government deficit. Apparently, the deficit hawks who take this route do 
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